Consumer Resistance Against Regulation: The Case of Health Care

Peter Zweifel (), Harry Telser () and Stephan Vaterlaus ()

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2006, vol. 29, issue 3, 319-332

Abstract: Regulation fostering Managed Care alternatives in health insurance is spreading. This work reports on an experiment designed to measure the amounts of compensation asked by the Swiss population (in terms of reduced premiums) for Managed-Care type restrictions in the provision of health care. It finds that restrictions on the freedom of physician choice would require an average compensation of more than one-third of the premium, while generic substitution even meets with a small willingness to pay. Marked preference heterogeneity is an argument against regulation imposing uniformity of contract in Swiss social health insurance. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006

Keywords: Health insurance; Health care; Regulation; Preference measurement; Discrete choice experiments; L51; D61; C93; I11; I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:regeco:v:29:y:2006:i:3:p:319-332

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DOI: 10.1007/s11149-006-7402-8

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