Enforcement and Information Strategies

Lars Hansen, Signe Krarup and Clifford Russell

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2006, vol. 30, issue 1, 45-61

Abstract: In this paper we show that, if the relation between the actual monitoring probability and the extent of compliance in the regulated population is concave to the actual probability axis, providing perfect information raises compliance rates, relative to what might be called the “keep-them-ignorant” option. We also illustrate that a quite simple method is available for checking whether, in a particular setting with a particular class of regulated parties, the full information or the keep-them-ignorant policy ought to be pursued. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2006

Keywords: Monitoring; Information; Regulation; Compliance; L51; K40; D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11149-006-0008-3

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