Factors that determine the cost-effectiveness ranking of second-best instruments for environmental regulation

Raúl O’Ryan ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Raul O'Ryan GAllardo ()

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2006, vol. 30, issue 2, 179-198

Abstract: This paper develops a conceptual model to analyze how specific factors affect the compliance costs of three suboptimal policy instruments, when compared to the optimal ambient permit system (APS) benchmark. The model considers a non-uniformly mixed pollutant and explicitly incorporates the following factors: number of polluting sources; size, in terms of emissions, of each process; marginal abatement costs for each process; effluent concentrations; the transfer coefficient that relates emissions to environmental quality at the receptor; and the desired environmental quality target. APS is compared to a suboptimal emission permit system (EPS), and two Command and Control (CAC) policies—equal percentage reduction (PER) and a uniform effluent concentration standard (STD). The results show the importance of the different factors and their interactions in determining each policy instrument’s cost-effectiveness ranking. Surprisingly, EPS performs well within the usual values of these factors and in specific cases STD and PER also perform similarly to APS. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2006

Keywords: Environmental regulation; Policy instrument choice; Cost-effectiveness; Environmental economics; Tradable permits; Command and control; Q58; Q50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11149-006-0014-5 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:regeco:v:30:y:2006:i:2:p:179-198

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... on/journal/11149/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11149-006-0014-5

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Regulatory Economics is currently edited by Menaham Spiegel

More articles in Journal of Regulatory Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().