An experimental analysis of the effects of automated mitigation procedures on investment and prices in wholesale electricity markets
Lynne Kiesling and
Bart Wilson
Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2007, vol. 31, issue 3, 313-334
Abstract:
In this paper we report the findings of an economic experiment that examines the effects of an automated mitigation procedure (AMP) on prices and capacity investment choices of suppliers in a wholesale electricity market. Specifically, we examine the effects of different market power incentives on markets with and without an AMP. While we find that the AMP does not affect overall investment in capacity, the most significant determinant of long-run prices is investment in new capacity. The AMP also does not reduce long-run prices relative to markets without an AMP. Furthermore, our participants successfully manipulated the AMP’s trigger price. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007
Keywords: Electric power markets; Automated mitigation procedures; investment; Price caps; C92; L11; L94 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:regeco:v:31:y:2007:i:3:p:313-334
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DOI: 10.1007/s11149-006-9018-4
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