Timing of environmental inspections: survival of the compliant

Sandra Rousseau

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2007, vol. 32, issue 1, 17-36

Abstract: Environmental inspection agencies have limited resources. A natural response to this shortage of resources is targeting and this targeting policy leads to higher compliance than random inspections. This paper uses individual inspection data on the inspection policy of the environmental agency for the textile industry in Flanders (Belgium). We distinguish between three types of inspections and use a survival model to show that the environmental agency inspects firms in a non-random way. Even though the agency solves most environmental problems, it can increase compliance by using the deterrence effect of more stringent inspections and sanctions. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Keywords: Environmental regulation; Monitoring and enforcement; Survival analysis; Textile industry; K42 Illegal behavior and the enforcement of law; Q53 Water pollution; C41 Survival analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:regeco:v:32:y:2007:i:1:p:17-36

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DOI: 10.1007/s11149-006-9013-9

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