An economic analysis of consumer class actions in regulated industries

Ingo Vogelsang, Nishal Ramphal (), Stephen Carroll () and Nicholas Pace ()

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2007, vol. 32, issue 1, 87-104

Abstract: Regulation and consumer class actions can complement, duplicate, or oppose each other, depending, among others, on the leanings of regulatory objective functions towards the industry or consumers. In particular, pro-consumer regulators would like to see consumers benefit from class actions while pro-industry regulators would like to prevent regulated firms from being harmed by them. However, because pro-consumer regulators are already doing their best for consumers and pro-industry regulators their best for firms, they are both usually constrained in their policies. The result is that class actions tend to be less efficient under pro-consumer regulators and more efficient under pro-industry regulators. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Keywords: Class action; Insurance regulation; Price regulation; Legal costs; Compensation; K13; K23; K41; L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.1007/s11149-007-9027-y

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