Effective regulation versus tacit collusion in the long-distance market: an empirical analysis

Simran Kahai () and David Kaserman ()

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2007, vol. 32, issue 3, 247-257

Keywords: Deregulation; Long-distance telecommunications; Tacit collusion; L1; L5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.1007/s11149-007-9034-z

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