The design of voluntary agreements in oligopolistic markets

Rinaldo Brau () and Carlo Carraro ()

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2011, vol. 39, issue 2, 142 pages

Keywords: Voluntary agreement; Voluntary approaches; New policy instruments; Environmental regulation; Coalition structures; Emission standards; K32; D21; Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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Working Paper: The Design of Voluntary Agreements in Oligopolistic Markets (2009)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11149-010-9134-z

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