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Consumer perception, information provision, and regulation of insurance markets

Kangoh Lee ()
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Kangoh Lee: San Diego State University

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2017, vol. 51, issue 1, 1-17

Abstract: Abstract Available evidence shows that consumers overinsure against modest risks. For instance, a majority of consumers tend to choose too low a level of deductible for homeowners insurance and automobile insurance, and purchase excessive warranties for electronics and other durable products such as automobiles and furniture. The analysis demonstrates that overinsurance decreases consumer welfare and increases insurers’ profits. This tendency of overinsurance stems from lack of information about the probability and magnitude of loss, and it calls for policies that require insurers or third-party organizations to provide more, albeit not perfect, information and data for consumers before they make insurance-purchase decisions. The implications of the analysis for other financial products such as stocks and deposits are discussed.

Keywords: Overinsurance; Consumer welfare; Insurer profits; Information; Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D18 D83 G22 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1007/s11149-017-9317-y

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