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Non-uniform implementation of uniform standards

Carmen Arguedas, Dietrich Earnhart and Sandra Rousseau

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2017, vol. 51, issue 2, No 2, 159-183

Abstract: Abstract Regulations are frequently based on a uniform standard, which applies to all facilities within a single industry. However, implementation of many of these regulations does not lead to uniform limits due to considerations of local conditions in real policy settings. In this paper, we theoretically examine the relationships among the stringency of effluent limits imposed on individual polluting facilities by permit writers, environmental protection agencies’ monitoring decisions, and the ambient quality of the local environment. In particular, we explore the establishment of effluent limits when (1) the national emission standard represents only an upper bound on the local issuance of limits and (2) negotiation efforts expended by regulated polluting facilities and environmentally concerned citizens play a role. We find that the negotiated discharge limit depends on the political weight enjoyed and the negotiation effort costs faced by both citizens and the regulated facility, along with the stringency of the national standard and local ambient quality conditions.

Keywords: Effluent limits; Monitoring; Inspections; Environmental permits; Wastewater; Compliance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 L51 Q53 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11149-017-9321-2

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