Regulatory arbitrage and the FERC rate settlement process

George Briden and Jonathan Lesser ()
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George Briden: Snake Hill Energy Resources, Inc.
Jonathan Lesser: Continental Economics, Inc.

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2017, vol. 51, issue 2, No 3, 184-196

Abstract: Abstract We demonstrate that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) regulatory procedures for natural gas pipelines, specifically its rate-refund policy, induces regulatory arbitrage that leads to economic distortions. Specifically, we demonstrate that the rate refund policy causes pipelines effectively to “extort” ratepayers through the addition of economically inefficient capital investment, akin to “gold-plating” investments. We estimate the potential magnitude of this arbitrage impact on ratepayers to be between $400 and $700 million annually. Counterintuitively, however, we demonstrate that the presence of this arbitrage opportunity leads to underinvestment in pipeline capacity, thus negating one of the principal purposes of rate regulation. We further demonstrate that FERC could easily eliminate this regulatory arbitrage by setting the refund interest rate to the pipeline’s as-filed weighted average cost of capital.

Keywords: Arbitrage; Regulation; Averch-Johnson (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 K2 L5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1007/s11149-017-9322-1

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