Effect of public procurement regulation on competition and cost-effectiveness
Bedri Kamil Onur Tas ()
Additional contact information
Bedri Kamil Onur Tas: TOBB ETU
Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2020, vol. 58, issue 1, No 3, 59-77
Abstract:
Abstract This study empirically investigates the impact of public procurement regulation quality on the competition for tenders and the cost-effectiveness of awarded contracts, by employing the World Bank’s Benchmarking Public Procurement and EuroPAM Public Procurement quality scores. Using extensive data on public procurement in the European Economic Area, Switzerland, and Macedonia, the analysis in this paper shows that higher quality public procurement regulatory regimes are associated with higher levels of competition and cost-effectiveness. Improved regulation quality significantly increases the number of bidders and the probability that the procurement price is lower than the estimated cost.
Keywords: Public procurement; Regulation; Competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H57 L51 O52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11149-020-09409-w Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:regeco:v:58:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s11149-020-09409-w
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... on/journal/11149/PS2
DOI: 10.1007/s11149-020-09409-w
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Regulatory Economics is currently edited by Menaham Spiegel
More articles in Journal of Regulatory Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().