The strategic impact of voluntary vs. mandated vertical restraints and termination restrictions on exclusion of rivals

Jacob Burgdorf ()
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Jacob Burgdorf: University of Louisville

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2021, vol. 59, issue 1, No 5, 94-107

Abstract: Abstract It has been shown that manufacturers can employ vertical practices and restraints to prevent entry in markets where upstream entrants require downstream accommodation. I show that if downstream product investment is important and encouraged by the restraint, foreclosing entry this way may not be credible. Additionally, publicly mandated vertical restraints and termination restrictions could prevent foreclosure, but if these restrictions reduce downstream product investment, they could have the opposite effect and decrease entry.

Keywords: Vertical restraints; Entry; Antitrust; Regulation; L12; L42; L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s11149-020-09419-8

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