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Self-regulation and governmental oversight: a theoretical and experimental study

Silvester Van Koten ()

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2021, vol. 59, issue 2, No 3, 174 pages

Abstract: Abstract A self-regulatory organization (SRO) is a non-governmental organization owned and operated by its members, with the power to create and enforce industry regulations and standards for its members. A key question is whether oversight by an SRO can replace governmental oversight, or whether supplementary governmental oversight is necessary. Using a formal model for the financial sector, and solving simultaneous games, I show that a lack of commitment by the SRO may necessitate governmental oversight of both SRO members and the SRO itself. The core of the model is supported by economics experiments.

Keywords: Self-regulatory organizations; Meta-regulation; Governmental oversight; Simultaneous versus sequential games; Economics experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 G18 G28 K20 L44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s11149-020-09421-0

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