Public Utility Valuation and Risk under Incentive Regulation

Wilbur G Lewellen and David C Mauer

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 1993, vol. 5, issue 3, 263-87

Abstract: The objective of providing inducements for public utilities to seek to improve the efficiency of their operations has been a longstanding regulatory concern. Among the evolving strategies for furthering that objective is a shift toward what has come to be referred to as "incentive" regulation. We examine here how this departure from past regulatory practice will affect the market value and market risk of the utility firm, and the specific manner in which an incentive mechanism can be implemented in order to achieve a desired valuation outcome. A particular focus is the establishment of boundaries on allowed rates of return under incentive regulation which are consistent with that desired outcome. The likely impact on utility ratepayers is considered. Copyright 1993 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1993
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