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Environmental regulation and energy efficiency: evidence from daily penalty policy in China

Kai Hu, Dandan Li (), Daqian Shi () and Wenli Xu
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Kai Hu: East China University of Science and Technology
Dandan Li: Hubei University of Economics
Daqian Shi: Wuhan University of Technology
Wenli Xu: Anhui University School of Economics

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2023, vol. 63, issue 1, No 1, 29 pages

Abstract: Abstract To achieve the twin aims of environmental improvement and economic progress, some cities in China have implemented a stringent environmental regulation, Daily Penalty Policy (DPP). Compared with previous environmental regulations, DPP dramatically increases the cost of environmental pollution, but it is unclear whether DPP can effectively control environmental pollution and improve economic development together. This study evaluates the environmental and economic effects of DPP by estimating the relationship between DPP and energy efficiency in time-varying difference-in-differences (Time-varying DID) models. Our results show that DPP increases the firm-level energy efficiency ( $$\beta $$ β =0.07, p

Keywords: Environmental regulation; Energy efficiency; Daily penalty policy; Economic development (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11149-022-09455-6

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