Raising rivals’ costs and right to repair laws: Separating the sheep from the goats?

Michael Dortz and Jeffrey Wagner ()
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Michael Dortz: Rochester Institute of Technology
Jeffrey Wagner: Rochester Institute of Technology

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2025, vol. 68, issue 1, No 1, 16 pages

Abstract: Abstract We conceptualize right to repair laws as requiring original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to walk back significant first-mover advantages, much of which comprise intellectual property rights. Doing so reduces rivals’ costs, which in turn increases competition in repair markets and environmental quality. Indeed, our microeconomic theory of right to repair laws shows that the credible threat of antitrust action or passage of a right to repair law may raise social welfare, as the OEM optimally walks back some of its information advantage in order to reduce the likelihood of these interventions. Back-of-the-envelope simulation of the model yields welfare comparisons.

Keywords: Consumer electronics; Electronic waste; Intellectual property; Raising rivals’ costs; Right to repair; Sustainable waste management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L49 O34 Q53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s11149-025-09490-z

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