The impact of multi-acquiring in the payment system: evidence from the Uruguayan financial inclusion program

Néstor Gandelman, Flavia Roldán () and Sofía Viera
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Néstor Gandelman: Universidad ORT Uruguay
Flavia Roldán: Universidad ORT Uruguay
Sofía Viera: Universidad ORT Uruguay

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2025, vol. 68, issue 2, No 3, 146-172

Abstract: Abstract This paper examines the transition from exclusive card network-acquirer relationships to a multi-acquiring model. It focuses on the case of Uruguay’s adoption of multi-acquiring in 2022, implemented within the framework of a broader financial inclusion program. Uruguay offers a distinctive case where multi-acquiring emerged within the industry through institutional dialogue, unlike other experiences where regulatory mandates played a central role in driving similar market transitions. We document significant market dynamics, including restructured relationships among incumbents and new market entrants. Our descriptive analysis, leveraging the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, reveals a decline in market concentration across all payment segments. While fee reductions were initially driven by a government-sponsored price agreement, the increased competition fostered by multi-acquiring likely stabilized these rates even after the agreement was no longer in effect. Large merchants benefited from enhanced efficiency, whereas small merchants faced adaptation challenges. These findings underscore the complexities of regulating two-sided payment markets and emphasize the need for balanced interventions to ensure a competitive payment ecosystem.

Keywords: Multi-acquiring; Payment systems; Financial inclusion; Competition; Uruguay (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 L11 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s11149-025-09494-9

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