 Effects of Securities Deregulation in Underwriting: An Analysis of SEC Rule 415M Wayne Marr, Jeffry M Netter and Annette B Poulsen Journal of Regulatory Economics, 1994, vol. 6, issue 1, 27-39 Abstract: In this paper we present evidence on the effects of Rule 415, the SEC Rule that relaxed the SEC's long-standing opposition to delayed offerings. Shelf registration allows securities to be offered on a continuous or delayed basis in certain circumstances. We provide evidence on one aspect of the controversy surrounding Rule 415's adoption: the effect of shelf registration on the distribution of underwriting revenues among brokers/dealers. We find, on average, all broker/dealers experienced an increase in underwriting revenues following the adoption of shelf registration due to an increase in total business financing. However, we find that the largest underwriters experienced an increase in underwriting revenues relative to total business financing. The relationship for smaller broker/dealers between underwriting revenues and total business financing did not change significantly after the adoption of shelf registration. Thus, shelf registration appears not to have harmed small broker/dealers. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers Date: 1994 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:regeco:v:6:y:1994:i:1:p:27-39 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Journal of Regulatory Economics is currently edited by Menaham Spiegel More articles in Journal of Regulatory Economics from Springer |
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