Quacks, Lemons, and Self Regulation: A Welfare Analysis

Thomas Gehrig and Peter-J Jost

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 1995, vol. 7, issue 3, 309-25

Abstract: This paper provides a framework in which suppliers of experience goods may find it in their best interests to provide, and enforce, quality standards. The incentives to form self-regulatory organizations are inversely related to ex-ante monitoring costs of the organization, as well as the number of members. This self-regulatory outcome is compared to statutory price and quality regulation. Without informational asymmetries between market participants and the social planer, self-regulatory outcomes can always be replicated by statutory regulation. Even with asymmetric information, self regulation is socially desirable only if the regulator values firm's profits sufficiently highly. Copyright 1995 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1995
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Working Paper: Quacks, Lemons, and Self-Regulation: A Welfare Analysis (1993)
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