Regulation and the Market for Corporate Control: Hostile Tender Offers for Electric and Gas Utilities

Robyn M McLaughlin and Hamid Mehran

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 1995, vol. 8, issue 2, 204 pages

Abstract: We document that regulation significantly constrains takeover activity. Of the twenty-one hostile offers for utilities between 1960 and 1990, only one was successful. In spite of this low rate of completion, announcement period returns to target utilities are positive and significant, although substantially smaller than average returns to nonregulated targets. We examine post-offer events and find that control-market effects are not entirely eliminated. One-third of hostile offers are followed by additional bids, control changes and/or divestitures. The regulatory and political environment changed during the period of this study and the frequency of hostile offers increased. Utility regulation, however, remains a substantial impediment to the completion of hostile takeovers. Copyright 1995 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1995
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