Regulating a Multi-product Monopolist

Jae-Cheol Kim and Choong-Young Jung

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 1995, vol. 8, issue 3, 299-307

Abstract: The purpose of the present paper is to construct a regulatory scheme that serves to correct suboptimal behavior of a multi-product monopolist in a situation of doubly asymmetric information, where the regulator cannot observe the monopolist's cost structure and consumers' preference while the monopolist cannot identify consumer types. We construct a tax scheme that induces the monopolist to offer socially optimal qualities to all types of consumers and discuss some interesting features of the scheme. Copyright 1995 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1995
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