Political Entrepreneurship and the Democratic Allocation of Economic Resources

Randall Holcombe

The Review of Austrian Economics, 2002, vol. 15, issue 2-3, 143-59

Abstract: Political entrepreneurship occurs when an individual acts on a political profit opportunity. These profit opportunities can be divided into two categories: productive, and predatory. Productive opportunities enable entrepreneurs to profit from enhancing the efficiency of government, while predatory opportunities enable entrepreneurs to profit from forcibly transferring resources from some to others. This analysis shows that political institutions tend to favor predatory over productive political entrepreneurship, and shows that what is sometimes referred to as political exchange does not have the same efficiency characteristics as voluntary exchange in private markets. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2002
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