Permanency and Flexibility of Institutions: The Role of Decentralization in Chinese Economic Reforms
Philippe Dulbecco () and
Marie-Françoise Renard
The Review of Austrian Economics, 2003, vol. 16, issue 4, 327-346
Abstract:
The purpose of this paper is to offer a Lachmannian analysis aimed at studying the coherence and the efficiency of reforms in China in terms of institutional change. The idea is that transition dynamics cannot be analyzed by reference to market criteria only; transition is, above all, a change in institutions. Every transition economy thus faces the problem of creating a new institutional framework which associates the co-ordination of activities by the market with the preservation of a centralized mechanism of resource allocation. We explain that, in China, this role is played by decentralization. Indeed, we demonstrate that Chinese economic reforms, of which the main institutional vector is decentralization, show the particularity of reconciling, within one single logic, the permanency of a well-established institutional order required for the co-ordination of individual plans, and the flexibility of institutions necessary for the move towards the market. We then defend the theory that both the success and the originality of Chinese economic reforms rest on their capacity to resolve the permanency-flexibility dilemma. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003
Keywords: institutional change; Chinese reforms; decentralization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1027345105462 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
Working Paper: Permanency and flexibility of institutions: the role of decentralisation in Chinese economic reforms (1999) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:revaec:v:16:y:2003:i:4:p:327-346
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11138/PS2
DOI: 10.1023/A:1027345105462
Access Statistics for this article
The Review of Austrian Economics is currently edited by Peter Boettke and Christopher Coyne
More articles in The Review of Austrian Economics from Springer, Society for the Development of Austrian Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().