Anti-Psychologism in Economics: Wittgenstein and Mises

Roderick T. Long ()

The Review of Austrian Economics, 2004, vol. 17, issue 4, 345-369

Abstract: Ludwig Wittgenstein's arguments for the conclusion that whatever counts as thought must embody logical principles can likewise be deployed to show that whatever counts as action must embody economic principles, a conclusion which in turn provides the basis for a defense of Ludwig von Mises' controversial claim that the laws of economics are a priori rather than empirical. The Wittgensteinian approach also points the way toward a transcendence of the intractable disputes among present-day Austrians over formalist versus hermeneutical, analytic versus synthetic, and impositionist versus reflectionist interpretations of economic method.

Date: 2004
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