Conflict, Cooperation and Competition in Anarchy

Tyler Cowen () and Daniel Sutter ()

The Review of Austrian Economics, 2005, vol. 18, issue 1, 109-115

Abstract: Caplan and Stringham (2002) attempt to rebut the “paradox of cooperation” (Cowen and Sutter 1999) as it applies to libertarian anarchy. The paradox in the context of anarchy implies that if private defense agencies can cooperate to avoid conflict they can also collude to reestablish coercion. Caplan and Stringham argue that arbitration is self-enforcing while collusion requires solution of a prisoner’s dilemma. We agree that collusion requires more cooperative efficacy than arbitration, but maintain that arbitration requires considerably more organization than a simple coordination game. If a network of protection agencies can organize sufficiently to arbitrate disputes, they can also create a barrier to entry by refusing to arbitrate with entrants. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Keywords: anarchy; cooperation; evolution of government (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11138-005-5595-1

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