The robust political economy of central banking and free banking

Pablo Paniagua ()

The Review of Austrian Economics, 2016, vol. 29, issue 1, 15-32

Abstract: This paper uses robust political economy to assess whether free banking or central banking can better use its institutional structures to minimize macroeconomic disequilibrium. Robust frameworks leverage their incentives, reward structures, and epistemic resources to achieve monetary policy objectives. We relax the assumptions of political pressure, self-interest, and the degree of decision makers’ knowledge to see which arrangements are more robust. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Keywords: Monetary disequilibrium; Federal reserve; Monetary policy; Robust political economy; Central banking; Free-banking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1007/s11138-015-0315-y

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