The super-alertness of central banks

Nicolas Cachanosky and Alexander W. Salter ()
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Alexander W. Salter: Texas Tech University

The Review of Austrian Economics, 2020, vol. 33, issue 1, No 11, 187-200

Abstract: Abstract This paper applies Kirzner’s theory of entrepreneurial alertness to central banking. As opposed to entrepreneurs operating within the market, central banks can operate outside the market by defining its structure and regulations. We label as “super-alertness” the particular type of Kirznerian alertness that central banks are required to have to successfully achieve stable monetary equilibrium.

Keywords: Free banking; Central banking; Alertness; Super-alertness; Monetary equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B53 D80 E50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11138-019-00436-1

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