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Who wins in the game of the market?

Ginny Seung Choi and Virgil Henry Storr ()
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Virgil Henry Storr: George Mason University

The Review of Austrian Economics, 2023, vol. 36, issue 1, No 10, 125-139

Abstract: Abstract Building on the Austrian understanding of the market as a sort of game, in this article, we explore what types of players (i.e. what kind of entrepreneurs) are likely to win in the game of the market. We conclude that the Austrian understanding of the market process suggests that markets systematically favor players who do certain kinds of things, have certain kinds of characteristics, and engage in certain kinds of activities. Specifically, successful market actors are likely to those entrepreneurs who (a) give their customers what they want, (b) have backgrounds, experiences and knowledge that prepare them to recognize profit opportunities, (c) are culturally attuned and embedded, and (d) are genuinely moral.

Keywords: Markets; Catallaxy; Morality; Games; Winners and Losers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s11138-022-00574-z

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