Behavioral economics and the problem of altruism

Sahar Akhtar ()
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Sahar Akhtar: Georgetown University

The Review of Austrian Economics, 2025, vol. 38, issue 2, No 3, 149-168

Abstract: Abstract A variety of economists welcome the positive findings and explanations of behavioral economics as an alternative to the standard methodology employed by neoclassical economists but question its normative conclusions when, in particular, such conclusions suggest a rejection of market institutions. This article’s main concern is to demonstrate, however, that the central ways that behavioral economics largely accepts the conceptual understandings and paradigm of neoclassical economics presents obstacles for the ability to adequately investigate a range of important empirical questions. I will show this largely in the context of discussions about, and ongoing research into, altruistic and other pro-social behavior.

Keywords: Behavioral economics; Altruism; Emotions; Preferences; Experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s11138-023-00636-w

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