Bargaining within the family can generate a political gender gap

Linda Cohen () and Amihai Glazer
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Linda Cohen: University of California, Irvine

Review of Economics of the Household, 2017, vol. 15, issue 4, No 16, 1399-1413

Abstract: Abstract Consider spouses who engage in Nash bargaining to allocate resources between them. The person with a higher income when unmarried enjoys a larger share of the joint income, and benefits less from an increase in joint income. This difference can cause spouses who have the same utility functions and the same family incomes to differ in their benefits from governmental tax and spending policies, and to cast opposing votes. In particular, these incentives can generate a gender gap, with women more supportive than men of governmental taxes and spending.

Keywords: Marriage; Bargaining; Taxes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D1 D78 H2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1007/s11150-015-9317-6

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