Cournot Oligopoly Conditions under which Any Horizontal Merger Is Profitable

Review of Industrial Organization, 2000, vol. 17, issue 3, 277-284

Keywords: Demand function; endogenous merger; equilibrium; market power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)

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Working Paper: Cournot Oligopoly Conditions Under Which Any Horizontal Merger is Profitable (2000)
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1007804129800

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