Licensing Requirements as a Coordination Mechanism for Entry

Sherrill Shaffer

Review of Industrial Organization, 2004, vol. 24, issue 3, 285-299

Abstract: Cheap talk, side payments, and arbitration are limited in their ability to coordinate asymmetric entry among symmetric potential entrants. Externally imposed licensing requirements may provide a viable mechanism to attain the desired asymmetric outcome in equilibrium.

Date: 2004
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