The Collusive Equilibrium in a Quantity-Setting Supergame: An Application to Taiwan’s Flour Industry

Tay-Cheng Ma ()

Review of Industrial Organization, 2005, vol. 27, issue 2, 107-124

Abstract: This paper examines the stability of the collusive equilibrium in Friedman’s repeated game through an empirical study of Taiwan’s flour market. We calculate the payoff streams following a deviation or adherence for each firm. The evidence shows that the specified punishment path is credible, and could sustain the collusive allocation. Copyright Springer 2005

Keywords: collusive equilibrium; excess capacity; repeated game; L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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DOI: 10.1007/s11151-005-1754-6

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