Renegotiation of Concession Contracts: A Theoretical Approach

J. Guasch, Jean-Jacques Laffont and Stephane Straub

Review of Industrial Organization, 2006, vol. 29, issue 1, 55-73

Abstract: We construct a regulation model in which renegotiation occurs due to the imperfect enforcement of concession contracts. This enables us to provide theoretical predictions for the impact, on the probability of renegotiation of a concession, of regulatory policy, institutional features, economic shocks and of several characteristics of the concession contracts themselves. Copyright Springer 2006

Keywords: Renegotiation; Concession contracts; Regulation; D7; L5; O54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (73)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11151-006-9109-5

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