Renegotiation of Concession Contracts: A Theoretical Approach
Jean-Jacques Laffont and
Stephane Straub ()
Review of Industrial Organization, 2006, vol. 29, issue 1, 55-73
We construct a regulation model in which renegotiation occurs due to the imperfect enforcement of concession contracts. This enables us to provide theoretical predictions for the impact, on the probability of renegotiation of a concession, of regulatory policy, institutional features, economic shocks and of several characteristics of the concession contracts themselves. Copyright Springer 2006
Keywords: Renegotiation; Concession contracts; Regulation; D7; L5; O54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:revind:v:29:y:2006:i:1:p:55-73
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