Fine-Tailored for the Cartel-Favoritism in Procurement

Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky and Grigory Kosenok

Review of Industrial Organization, 2009, vol. 35, issue 1, 95-121

Keywords: Auction; Collusion; Favoritism; Procurement; D44; D73; H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11151-009-9220-5

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