Areeda–Turner and the Treatment of Exclusionary Pricing under U.S. Antitrust and EU Competition Policy

Stephen Martin ()

Review of Industrial Organization, 2015, vol. 46, issue 3, 229-252

Abstract: The paper begins with a “readers’ guide” to Areeda and Turner (Harv Law Rev 88:697–733, 1975 ). It continues to explain the differing receptions of the price-unit cost approach to evaluating predatory pricing in U.S. antitrust policy and EU competition policy in terms of differing views on the likelihood that predation will occur and differing weights given to the probability of incorrectly condemning competition on the merits as predatory and incorrectly exonerating predatory behavior as competition on the merits. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Keywords: Areeda–Turner rule; Predatory pricing; Antitrust; Competition policy; L12; L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/s11151-015-9458-z

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