Economics at the FCC, 2016–2017: Auction Designs for Spectrum Repurposing and Universal Service Subsidies

Evan Kwerel (), Paroma Sanyal (), Katja Seim (), Martha Stancill () and Patrick Sun
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Evan Kwerel: Federal Communications Commission
Paroma Sanyal: Federal Communications Commission
Katja Seim: The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania
Martha Stancill: Federal Communications Commission

Review of Industrial Organization, 2017, vol. 51, issue 4, No 4, 486 pages

Abstract: Abstract The Federal Communications Commission is responsible for federal regulation in the telecommunications and electronic media sectors, and for management of the nation’s non-federal radio frequency spectrum. During the past year, Commission economists contributed to the agency’s ongoing efforts to use market-based mechanisms—such as auctions—to allocate spectrum and distribute universal service subsidies efficiently. This includes repurposing broadcast television spectrum for more efficient use by wireless service providers through the recently concluded Broadcast Incentive Auction and structuring auction mechanisms to promote efficient allocation of universal service subsidies for the increased build-out of mobile wireless and fixed broadband service in unserved and underserved areas.

Keywords: Broadband; FCC; Spectrum auctions; Two-sided auctions; Universal service (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11151-017-9597-5

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