Strategic Interaction in a Repeated Game: Evidence from NCAA Football Recruiting

Brad Humphreys and Jane Ruseski

Review of Industrial Organization, 2018, vol. 52, issue 2, No 7, 283-303

Abstract: Abstract We analyze decisions to comply or cheat on NCAA recruiting regulations in the context of repeated interactions. Teams possess private information about resources devoted to football programs, recruiting effort made by rival programs, and rival program behavior. We test for evidence that the behavior of NCAA Division IA football programs conforms to predictions from repeated game theoretic models using panel data from IA football over the period 1978–2005. We find anecdotal and empirical support for strategic interaction. The presence of in-conference rivals under NCAA sanctions increases the probability of a team being placed under future sanctions.

Keywords: NCAA; Recruiting; Strategic interaction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Z22 Z28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1007/s11151-017-9600-1

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