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Economics at the FTC: Non-price Merger Effects and Deceptive Automobile Ads

Matthew Jones (), Bruce Kobayashi () and Jason O’Connor ()
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Matthew Jones: Federal Trade Commission
Bruce Kobayashi: Federal Trade Commission
Jason O’Connor: Federal Trade Commission

Review of Industrial Organization, 2018, vol. 53, issue 4, 593-614

Abstract: Abstract Economists at the Federal Trade Commission analyze a wide range of activities, practices, and policies in support of the agency’s consumer protection and competition missions as demonstrated by the two economic analyses discussed in this article. The first section of this article describes the economic analysis of a proposed merger’s impact on non-price dimensions of competition in the daily fantasy sports market. The second section builds an economic model to quantify the harm to consumers from deceptive advertising in automobile markets.

Keywords: Antitrust; Consumer protection; Deception; FTC; Mergers; Non-price competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:53:y:2018:i:4:d:10.1007_s11151-018-9669-1