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The Chilean Anti-cartel Experience: Accomplishments and Challenges

Umut Aydin () and Nicolás Figueroa ()
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Umut Aydin: Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
Nicolás Figueroa: Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

Review of Industrial Organization, 2019, vol. 54, issue 2, 327-352

Abstract: Abstract We evaluate the Chilean law and enforcement record in the area of cartels. We identify the high probability of cartel detection, severe sanctions for detected cartels, and the predictability and consistency of enforcement practices as crucial factors that help enforcement agencies maximize the deterrent effect of anti-cartel law and policy. Reforms to the competition law in Chile in 2009 and 2016 have increased the probability of cartel detection by introducing more extensive investigative powers and a leniency program, have made sanctions more severe by increasing monetary fines and introducing prison sentences, and have improved the predictability of the leniency program.

Keywords: Antitrust; Cartel; Competition policy; Chile; Regulation; Institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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