Patent Licensing and Technological Catch-Up in a Heterogeneous Duopoly

Bruno Badia ()

Review of Industrial Organization, 2019, vol. 55, issue 2, No 5, 287-300

Abstract: Abstract A cost-reducing innovation is available to Cournot duopolists through licensing. The firms are ex ante heterogeneous and adoption of the innovation impacts them differently. Is it possible for the inefficient duopolist to catch up with its efficient rival? Under certain conditions, yes. The conditions, however, are stringent: It is not sufficient, for instance, that the innovation promotes a change in the efficiency rank of the firms.

Keywords: Patent licensing; Cournot duopoly with heterogeneous firms; Cost-reducing innovation; Technological catch-up (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11151-018-09675-1 Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:revind:v:55:y:2019:i:2:d:10.1007_s11151-018-09675-1

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... on/journal/11151/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11151-018-09675-1

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Industrial Organization is currently edited by L.J. White

More articles in Review of Industrial Organization from Springer, The Industrial Organization Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().