Managerial Control and Executive Compensation

F. M. Scherer ()
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F. M. Scherer: Harvard University (Emeritus)

Review of Industrial Organization, 2020, vol. 56, issue 2, No 6, 315-327

Abstract: Abstract This article analyzes the trajectory and causes of the explosion of American corporate CEOs’ compensation relative to that of average workers between 1958 and 2017. The historical data are presented and analyzed in more detail for 2016 and 2017. Important biases in alternative data sets are explored. Alternative hypotheses for the dramatic changes over time are proposed but not resolved. Among other things, the paper investigates the role of tax and other government policy changes and regulation-induced innovations in the organization of executive pay determination.

Keywords: Corporate governance; Managerial compensation; Principal–agent problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 L21 M12 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11151-019-09691-9

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