The Intellectual Property-Antitrust Interface

Roger Blair

Review of Industrial Organization, 2020, vol. 56, issue 4, No 1, 557-561

Abstract: Abstract There is a tension between the antitrust laws and the intellectual property (IP) laws. Both aim to promote social welfare, but their focus differs. By and large, antitrust law aims to promote competition and static welfare. In contrast, IP law permits static welfare losses in exchange for dynamic welfare gains. Thus, there is a tradeoff between static and dynamic welfare considerations. This tradeoff leads to a natural tension between IP law and antitrust policy. Implicitly, we believe that the benefits of long-term progress outweigh the short-run welfare losses that are due to the misallocation of resources. This can be seen in our Special Issue.

Keywords: Antitrust policy; Intellectual property; Patents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/s11151-020-09759-x

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