Economics at the FCC 2019–2020: Spectrum Policy, Universal Service, Inmate Calling Services, and Telehealth

Allison Baker (), Patrick Brogan (), Octavian Carare (), Nicholas Copeland (), Patrick DeGraba (), Steven Kauffman (), Paul Lafontaine (), Catherine Matraves (), Jeffrey Prince, Sean Sullivan (), Patrick Sun and Emily Talaga ()
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Allison Baker: Federal Communications Commission
Patrick Brogan: Federal Communications Commission
Octavian Carare: Federal Communications Commission
Nicholas Copeland: Federal Communications Commission
Patrick DeGraba: Federal Communications Commission
Steven Kauffman: Federal Communications Commission
Paul Lafontaine: Federal Communications Commission
Catherine Matraves: Federal Communications Commission
Sean Sullivan: Federal Communications Commission
Emily Talaga: Federal Communications Commission

Review of Industrial Organization, 2020, vol. 57, issue 4, No 6, 827-858

Abstract: Abstract The U.S. Federal Communications Commission is responsible for regulation in the communications marketplace and for management of the nation’s non-federal radio frequency spectrum. During the past year, FCC economists helped develop efficient mechanisms for making available more flexible-use spectrum for the deployment of advanced broadband technologies; developed two new universal service funding mechanisms that aim to close the digital broadband divide; and, through careful analysis of firm cost data, contributed to a renewed effort by the Commission to develop price caps for interstate calls on prison inmate calling services. FCC economists also contributed to the Commission’s extensive response to COVID-19.

Keywords: FCC; Telecommunications policy; Spectrum policy; Universal service; Rural digital opportunity fund; 5G fund; Inmate calling services; COVID-19 and telehealth (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/s11151-020-09791-x

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