Non-Controlling Minority Shareholdings and Collusion

Samuel Haas () and Johannes Paha
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Samuel Haas: Justus-Liebig-University

Review of Industrial Organization, 2021, vol. 58, issue 3, No 4, 454 pages

Abstract: Abstract This article merges theoretical literature on non-controlling minority shareholdings (NCMS) in a coherent model to study the effects of NCMS on competition and collusion. The model encompasses both the case of a common owner holding shares of rival firms as well as the case of cross ownership among rivals. We find that by softening competition, NCMS weaken the sustainability of collusion under a greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. Such effects exist, in particular, in the presence of an effective competition authority.

Keywords: Collusion; Common ownership; Cross ownership; Minority shareholdings (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11151-020-09758-y

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