Optimal Incentives for Patent Challenges in the Pharmaceutical Industry

Enrico Böhme (), Jonas Severin Frank () and Wolfgang Kerber ()
Additional contact information
Jonas Severin Frank: Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office)
Wolfgang Kerber: Philipps-University Marburg

Review of Industrial Organization, 2021, vol. 59, issue 3, No 4, 503-528

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we show that a provision in antitrust law to allow patent settlements with a later market entry of generics than the date that is expected under patent litigation can increase consumer welfare. We introduce a policy parameter for determining the optimal additional period for collusion that would incentivize the challenging of weak patents and maximize consumer welfare. While in principle, later market entry leads to higher profits and lower consumer welfare, this can be more than compensated for if more patents are challenged as a result.

Keywords: Antitrust; Collusion; Patent challenges; Patent settlements; Pharma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11151-021-09815-0 Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal Incentives for Patent Challenges in the Pharmaceutical Industry (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:revind:v:59:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s11151-021-09815-0

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... on/journal/11151/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11151-021-09815-0

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Industrial Organization is currently edited by L.J. White

More articles in Review of Industrial Organization from Springer, The Industrial Organization Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().