Is Amnesty Plus More Successful in Fighting Multimarket Cartels? An Exploratory Analysis

Karine Brisset (), Francois Cochard () and Eve-Angeline Lambert
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Karine Brisset: Université de Franche-Comté
Francois Cochard: Université de Franche-Comté

Review of Industrial Organization, 2023, vol. 63, issue 2, No 5, 237 pages

Abstract: Abstract This experiment shows how different levels of fines in three antitrust policies—no leniency (NL), standard leniency (LP), and amnesty plus (AP)—can deter multimarket cartels. With a low fine, AP significantly increases multimarket cartels and leads to higher prices. With a high fine, it has the same effect on collusion as do other policies. With regard to one-market cartels, AP decreases cartel stability relative to LP. With a high fine, it leads to more reporting than does LP, before any investigation and after a first cartel conviction. Higher fines also lead to higher prices in NL and LP, but not higher than in AP.

Keywords: Antitrust; Multimarket cartels; Leniency programs; Leniency plus; Price competition with differentiated products (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D03 K21 K42 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s11151-023-09919-9

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