The Coase Conjecture When the Monopolist and Customers have Different Discount Rates
Tim Groseclose ()
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Tim Groseclose: George Mason University
Review of Industrial Organization, 2025, vol. 66, issue 3, No 4, 349-365
Abstract:
Abstract One of the most famous and outstanding formalizations of the Coase Conjecture is by Gul et al. (J Econ Theory 39(1):155–190, 1986. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90024-4 ) peculiarity of their model—as well as nearly all other examinations of the Coase Conjecture, including that by Coase himself—is that it assumes that the monopolist and customers have the same discount rate. I re-examine their model, while relaxing this restriction. Gul et. al. show that, if the (common) discount rate of the monopolist and customers approaches one, then the Coase Conjecture follows. I show that one only needs the discount rate of the customers to approach one for this to be true. I also show a second result: If the customers’ discount rate is fixed at a value less than one, while the monopolist’s discount rate approaches one, then the Coase Conjecture is guaranteed not to follow.
Keywords: Coase Conjecture; Durable-goods monopoly; Bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C79 D7 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s11151-024-09990-w
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