A Unified Model of Corporate Acquisitions and Divestitures: An Incentive Perspective

Yoon K Choi and Larry J Merville

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 1998, vol. 10, issue 2, 127-54

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to unify corporate acquisitions and divestitures (e.g., spin-offs, equity carve-outs and sell-offs) into a simple but comprehensive agency model where risk and managerial incentives interact to determine an optimal corporate governance and an incentive compensation scheme. Emphasizing human and nonhuman aspect of corporate assets, the model not only explains existing empirical evidence regarding contractual and organizational changes, but also suggests new perspective regarding firms' behavior around corporate acquisitions and divestitures. Thus, it attempts to reconcile between synergistic and agency viewpoints in the takeover literature and provides determining factors in choosing between spinoffs and equity carve-outs. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0924-865X/contents link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:rqfnac:v:10:y:1998:i:2:p:127-54

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/finance/journal/11156/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting is currently edited by Cheng-Few Lee

More articles in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().